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# Marine Casualty Investigations

# Enquêtes sur les accidents maritimes

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# FISHING VESSELS

Summaries of Reports of Investigations
into Marine Casualties and Accidents
Aboard Ships

Issue No. 4 April 1988

## Summaries of Fishing Vessel Marine Casualties and Accidents

This publication summarizes the Reports of Investigation into marine casualties and/or marine accidents involving fishing vessels which were investigated by the Marine Casualty Investigations Division of Transport Canada and is published three times a year. There is another publication covering commercial vessels and other craft.

**Note:**

1. A glossary of terms and abbreviations used can be found at the end of this publication.

2. Unless stated otherwise, all times mentioned in this publication are local times.

3. Unless stated otherwise, all Regulations referred to in this publication are made pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act.

The full report of the summaries contained herein may be obtained by writing to:

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Ottawa, Ontario
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Their contents may be deficient and misleading if used in any other process and are not to be used or admitted in evidence in any legal proceedings, either civil or criminal, arising out of any casualty described therein. The statements, opinions and findings in the reports and summaries are those of the Marine Casualty Investigations Division only and do not constitute admissions made by or on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada.

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"MARIO LYNE"

Fire on board while moored alongside Ste-Thérèse-de-Gaspé wharf, April 5, 1987.

---

**Summary**

The "MARIO LYNE" was built and registered at Paspebiac, Que., in 1976. She is a small fishing vessel, engaged in crab fishing of 38 gross tons and a registered length of 15.6 m. She is propelled by a six cylinder diesel engine driving a single fixed pitch propeller.

In the evening of April 4, her crew was engaged in preparing the vessel for the upcoming fishing season. Before they disembarked for the night, the stove regulator was adjusted to its lowest level to reduce the flow of diesel to the cast-iron stove. The stove, located in the crew accommodation, was used for cooking and also for space heating of the accommodation and wheel-house, which spaces are common.

During the night the wind was light and variable with a temperature just above freezing. The following morning, fire was discovered on board the "MARIO LYNE" and the owner was informed. He proceeded immediately to the scene after having arranged for the police/firemen to be called. While awaiting their arrival, in an attempt to deprive the fire of oxygen, he closed a mushroom ventilator to the crew accommodation and a duct near the main engine exhaust pipe. All other ventilation had been closed by the crew the preceding night.

At 0619 firemen from Grande-Rivière arrived on the scene nine minutes after being called. They quickly extinguished the fire with two fire hoses using water from the fire truck.

It was found that the vessel had sustained considerable fire damage to the wooden watertight bulkhead between the crew accommodation and the engine-room. The bulkhead was partly consumed by fire at the back of, and above, the stove. There had been a protective asbestos sheet fitted to the bulkhead in this area. Other damage to the vessel was caused by heat, smoke and water.

When fuel flow to the stove is at a low setting and, if debris from lighting the burner is present, the debris may act as a wick above the surface of the fuel. The temperature at which the diesel burns is thus lower than when the burner is in normal operation. Diesel flowing to the burner is too cold to immediately ignite and burns slower and incompletely. Fuel may thus accumulate until its level reaches that of the flame, at which time the whole surface of the oil will re-ignite, burn fiercely and overheat the stove. Since the

elements of the stove were found in place after the fire was extinguished, it is unlikely that an explosion caused this casualty. Moreover, there was no liquefied petroleum gas (propane) on this vessel.

The fire caused neither human injury nor pollution. It is estimated that the cost of repairs to the vessel is in the region of $120,000.

**Findings**

On April 5, 1987, the small fishing vessel "MARIO LYNE" caught fire while moored, unattended, at Ste-Thérèse-de-Gaspé wharf. While the precise causes of the fire cannot be positively identified, it would appear that:

- the cast-iron stove used for cooking and heating the crew accommodation caused the fire;
- the fuel flow regulator of this stove was adjusted to its lowest setting just before the crew left the vessel;
- fuel may have accumulated inside the burner, caught fire and burning fiercely, given off intense heat; and
- the asbestos panel protecting the bulkhead behind the stove could not prevent the wood from catching fire.

**Other Findings**

All openings were closed except for one mushroom ventilator forward and one ventilation duct to the engine-room. The supply oxygen to the fire was therefore restricted which undoubtedly slowed the fire's progression.

The police/firemen intervened rapidly and extinguished the fire without difficulty.




"MARIO LYNE"

| | |
|---|---|
| REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. L/C 4002 | SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° L/C 4002 DU SHC |

**"JEAN MATHIEU"**

**Loss overboard of a crew member whilst setting crab pots in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, April 26, 1987.**

---


Summary

The 87 gross ton Canadian fishing vessel, "JEAN MATHIEU", was built of steel in 1986. The vessel was loaded with 72 crab pots that were stowed horizontally in three rows of four and piled six high. At about 0700, April 26, 1987, the vessel departed Cap aux Meules, Que., with a crew of six, bound for the crab fishing grounds 40 miles NW of Isles de la Madeleine, Que. The winds were northerly at 10 knots with near-calm seas.

Upon arrival at the fishing grounds at about 1300, the skipper was alone in the wheel-house and the crew commenced setting the crab pots from the afterdeck. Of the five crew members, four were divided into two teams of two with one team operating from the port side while the other from the starboard side. The fifth crew member was baiting the pots in the fore part of the afterdeck. Each time a crab pot was ready to be set, the skipper increased the engine's speed to 'half ahead' then signaled to the appropriate team to push the crab pot over the side.

At about 1540, Ghislain Poirier of the port team who was standing on the second tier, removed his lifejacket before attending to the next crab pot on the third tier. When it was ready to be set and upon receiving instructions from the skipper, the port team pushed the crab pot over the side. Ghislain Poirier was seen falling overboard with the crab pot as the pot warp payed out at a fast rate over the port bulwark.

Alerted by the crew, the skipper stopped the main engine and backed the vessel towards the major buoy which was visible some 50 m aft. In the hope of finding the victim, the buoy was picked up by passing the pot warp through the lifting gear block. As the crab pot was hoisted, the victim appeared on the surface but he was apparently unconscious as he was not grasping the pot warp.

A crew member jumped overboard and was able to hold onto the victim by the waist and put a lifebuoy over his head and under the victim's arms. However, before the crew was able to recover the victim, he slipped away under the lifebuoy and disappeared below the surface at 1550, in position 47°57'N, 62°20'W. A search was carried out for half an hour with negative results. The victim is presumed drowned and to date his body has not been found.

The "JEAN MATHIEU" did not report the accident to the authorities as required by the Shipping Casualties Reporting Regulations because the skipper who was the brother of the victim personally wanted to inform his parents. The crew continued setting all the crab pots before heading for Cap aux Meules. Upon arrival, the skipper reported the accident by telephone to CGRS Cap aux Meules.

**Findings**

On April 26, 1987, in fine weather conditions, a crew member of the "JEAN MATHIEU" fell overboard whilst pushing over the side a crab pot and drowned. It would appear that the following factors contributed to the accident and loss of life:

- the setting of 112 kg crab pots from a position several crab pot tiers above the deck rendered the operation dangerous;

- a necessary acceleration of the vessel's speed each time a crab pot was set further rendered the operation even more dangerous;

- while pushing a crab pot over the side, the victim slipped, lost his balance and fell overboard with the crab pot; and

- since the victim was a non-swimmer and was wearing neither a lifejacket nor a personal flotation device, once in the water, the victim instinctively grasped the crab pot and was quickly dragged to the bottom.

**Other Findings**

The victim had removed his lifejacket moments before the accident.

The accident was not immediately reported to a Canadian ship reporting station as required by the Shipping Casualties Reporting Regulations.

The pot setting procedure, by its very nature, is hazardous and this accident once again stresses the need for the crew engaged in such activities to wear some form of a personal flotation device.


"JEAN MATHIEU"
POSITION OF CASUALTY
LIEU DU SINISTRE
GULF OF ST LAWRENCE
GOLFE SAINT-LAURENT
DETROIT DE JACQUES-CARTIER
ILE D'ANTICOSTI
DETROIT DE HONGUEDO
GASPE
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
ILE DU PRINCE ÉDOUARD
CHARLOTTETOWN
NORTHUMBERLAND STRAIT
Moncton
Saint John
FUNDY
Hantsport
HALIFAX
NOVA SCOTIA / NOUVELLE-ÉCOSSE
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
Sydney
Louisbourg
Point Tupper
Strait of Canso
CABOT STRAIT
LAURENTIAN

F/V B.P.
"JEAN MATHIEU"

Afterdeck. Pont arrière.

**"AUSTRAL"**

**Loss overboard of a crew member whilst the vessel was moored at the fishermen's wharf in Matane, Quebec, May 20, 1987.**

---

**Summary**

The small fishing vessel "AUSTRAL", gross tonnage 37, is of wooden construction and was built in 1977. She is registered at Gaspé, Québec. Her wheel-house is forward and extends over the whole width of the vessel. Its roof also extends 2.5 m over the afterdeck. The vessel has a crew of six.

During the night of May 19 to 20, 1987, the vessel was moored overnight at the fisherman's wharf in Matane, Québec. The vessel did not have a safe means of access (gangway or ladder) rigged to the wharf, however the vessel had been moored abeam of a ladder set into the wharf face.

Two crew members had gone ashore, the other four went to bed. Of the crew members who went ashore, one returned aboard at approximately 0230 on May 20, while the other, Alain Denis stayed on later in town with his girlfriend.

At approximately 0350, May 20, 1987, when it was calculated that the wheel-house roof was about 1.80 m below the level of the top of the wharf, the sleeping fishermen were awakened by a sound which they attributed to that made by someone jumping onto the wheel-house roof, followed by the sound of something falling into the water. On investigating, they observed a splash-mark between the vessel and the wharf. There was a skid-mark in the dew on the vessel's wheel-house roof, and a foot print also in the dew, on the rounded steel edge of the wharf. There was no one on the surface of the water. No cry for help was heard.

As only Alain Denis was missing, the other crew members suspected that it was he who had fallen in the water. The person with whom he had spent the evening was contacted by telephone, and it was confirmed that Alain Denis had arrived on the quay about 0350, having been driven there by car.

Thus convinced that Alain Denis had fallen overboard, and not having the means to attempt his rescue, the crew contacted Matane Police. A rescue team quickly arrived on the scene and organized an underwater search. At approximately 0545 on May 20, 1987, the body of the victim was found, on the bottom, by divers in 7 m of water, between the vessel and the wharf. The body was taken to a Hospital at Matane where all efforts to revive it failed.

A coroner's investigation attributed the death of the victim to asphyxiation caused by drowning. No contusions or bruises were found on the body. There was however an alcohol level of 176 mg per 100 mL of blood, indicating that in the moments preceding his death, the victim was under the influence of alcohol.

The victim was a non-swimmer.

## Findings

A fisherman fell overboard and drowned from the F.V. "AUSTRAL, while the vessel was moored alongside the fisherman's wharf at Matane at about 0350 on May 20, 1987.

It would appear that several factors contributed to this tragedy, these were:

- the victim did not employ a ladder set into the wharf face abeam of the vessel to embark;
- no safe means of access was provided between the vessel and the shore as required by Section 54(1), Ladders and Gangways, of The Safe Working Practices Regulations;
- the victim jumped or fell a vertical distance of about 1.80 m from the wharf to the vessel's wheel-house roof, where he slipped and fell into the water;
- the dew on the wheel-house roof and on the rounded edge of the wharf made both slippery; and
- the victim was under the influence of alcohol.

## Other Findings

As the victim was not seen on the surface immediately after he fell into the water, and no cry for help from him was heard, he probably sank straight to the bottom on falling overboard.


"AUSTRAL"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. L/C 1236
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° L/C 1236 DU SHC
67°40'W
49°00'N
CAMPBELLTON
NEW BRUNSWICK
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
MONCTON
CHARLOTTETOWN
SYDNEY
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
FREDERICTON
NOVA SCOTIA
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH
Ven carrooche Sea Inset
POSITION OF ACCIDENT
LIEU DE L'ACCIDENT
Petite-Matane
Matane
Rivière Petite Matane
Saint-Luc
Saint-Ulric
Rivière Blanche
Pointe aux Naufrages
Le Grande Anse
INTERPOLATEUR LINEAIRE LC
LORAN LINEAR INTERPOLA

The "AUSTRAL" tied up alongside Matane fisherman's quay.

L'"AUSTRAL" amarré au quai des pêcheurs à Matane.




(A) The rounded edge of the quay.
(A) L'abord du quai de forme arrondie.

(B) Location of skid-mark on vessel's roof.
(B) Le toit du bateau où il y avait une trace de pas qui dérappait.

**"OPEN BOAT CFV 099567"**

**Loss overboard of the lone operator in Bay of Islands, Nfld. June 10, 1987.**

---

**Summary**

The 77 year old experienced and active fisherman Mr. John Saunders fished alone from his open, flat-bottom, 4.486 m boat powered by a 25 h.p. outboard motor. The vessel was equipped with a lifejacket as required by the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations; however, when engaged in fishing the operator was known not to wear it.

The weather was clear in mist and rain showers with negligible wind and calm seas as the operator departed Cox's Cove, Nfld., at 0600, June 10, 1987 alone in his boat with a lunch bag to tend a string of 200 lobster pots in the Penguin Arm. When the operator did not return by 1300 as was his routine, his wife became concerned and tried unsucessfully to contact her son by telephone. However, it was felt that the operator was taking some of his less lucrative pots ashore and thus would be returning late.

Shortly after 1800, her son returned home from his employment in Corner Brook, Nfld. and learned that his father had not returned from the fishing trip. He immediately departed in his open boat, accompanied by his wife, to search for his father. They checked the cabin as they searched along the route normally taken by his father, and as they exited from the south side of the Penguin Arm at about 1845, they spotted the father's boat near the cliff at Penguin Head. The boat was wedged on the rock against the cliff. There was no sign of Mr. Saunders and shouts by the son for his father went unanswered.

They then returned to Cox's Cove to summon additional help and while his wife notified the RCMP, he replenished the boat with fuel and, accompanied by another fisherman, he headed directly towards Penguin Head where they were joined in their search by other local residents and fishermen, and later by the RCMP. An organized search was initiated and the aid of a local fishery officer was sought. The MRSC St. John's was notified at 1953 and shortly thereafter a Buffalo aircraft form PEI and a Labrador helicopter from Gander, Nfld. were tasked. Both aircraft were limited in their search effort when fog developed over the area and at 2304 they were forced to return to Deer Lake, Nfld. They were stood down at 2343 that same night and were prevented from participating in further SAR operations due to poor visibility. Extensive search of the area by the RCMP and local residents continued for the next five days but Mr. Saunders was not found. The search was downgraded at the end of the day, on June 15, 1987 but the search for Mr. Saunders was to continue

periodically.

In an effort to locate Mr. Saunders, his string of pots was hauled to determine his movements. All but his last pot were found to have been rebaited, thus indicating that he had reached the second last one. Somehow between that pot and the last one, Mr. Saunders was believed to have fallen overboard from his boat which was found aground some 60 m from the last pot.

Examination of the boat when found indicated that the plug was not in place but that it was inside the boat along with a spare plug and a large flat rock that was used to knock the plug tightly in place. The gas tank for the motor was dislodged from its wooden frame and overturned. There was evidence of gasoline spillage and none remained in the tank. The fuel line to the motor contained no fuel and the outboard motor was down in the operating position in the forward gear with the throttle set at about ¼ open. The boat was later towed back to Cox's Cove after the plug had been fitted and it was found not to leak at that time. To determine if it had failed, the motor was tried and found to start easily and operated as designed.

**Findings**

On June 10, 1987, while alone tending his lobster pots from his open boat, Mr. Saunders apparently fell from his boat into the water and drowned. The boat was found aground, with minor damage.

It would appear that Mr. Saunders fell overboard after the plug was unshipped in an attempt to drain excess water from his boat. In the absence of neither body nor witnesses, the precise cause for his fall overboard could not be established but it would appear that he lost his life due to the following contributory factors:

- the victim was alone, not wearing any form of personal flotation device and could not swim;
- the victim may have been fatigued having attended to approximately 200 lobster pots;
- the cold water temperature limited his survival time to about 2 hours had he been wearing an approved lifejacket;
- the victim was wearing heavy clothing; and
- the victim's age.


58°05'W
58°00'W
49°10'N
49°05'N
1 N M
COX'S COVE
BOAT FOUND HERE
LIEU OÙ BATEAU TROUVÉ
ST JOHN'S
GANDER
"UNNAMED BOAT"
REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4653
SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° 4653 DU SHC

Recovered open boat used by fisherman.
Bateau non ponté récupéré utilisé par un pêcheur.



## "ZEILA"

**Loss overboard of a crew member while engaged in fishing off Cape Race, Nfld., June 18, 1987.**

---

**Summary**

The 671 gross-ton, deep-sea stern trawler is 43.55 m long and was built in Norway in 1975. The vessel, with a crew of 14, departed Catalina, Nfld., on June 17, 1987 and upon arrival, commenced fishing on The Grand Banks of Newfoundland. At about 0530, June 18, while towing her gear in 40-45 fathoms of water, the trawl fouled on the sea-bed effectively anchoring the vessel. The vessel was stopped and the propeller pitch placed in neutral to reduce the strain on the warps and gear. The weather conditions were south-west winds at 5-10 knots, good visibility and moderate seas.

Six crew members were called on deck to assist in freeing the fouled trawl from the sea-bed; this procedure is similar to that of hauling in the trawl and had, in all respects, been normal up to the point where the back strop was in position to be disconnected. One crew member left his position from behind the crash rail and as he bent down to unshackle the port side trawl door back strop connection, the tension on the pennant chain and the net wire increased as the vessel rose on a wave crest. This caused the second link at the forward end of the pennant chain to part. The pennant chain which had been under tension struck the crew member with force and knocked him over the safety line onto the ramp, from where he tumbled into the sea; the safety line was stretched between the port and starboard crash rails. The time was 0545. The crew member appeared to be unconscious as he made no effort to reach out to a lifebuoy which had been thrown to him from the vessel. A considerable amount of blood was seen in the water about the man who, although not wearing a lifejacket or a PFD, was initially floating on his back.

The OOW, who was in the wheel-house, on catching a glimpse of what had happened, immediately sent for the master and rushed with other crew members to launch the lifeboat. However, before the boat could be launched, the victim disappeared beneath the surface.

The accident was immediately reported to the vessel's management and appropriate authorities. Six vessels in the immediate area aided in the search and when the body was not recovered by the end of the day on June 19, the case was handed over to the RCMP as a 'missing person' case.

Examination and test of the pennant chain following the incident revealed that it was of a superior quality but many

of its links were stretched out of shape. The breaking strength of the deformed links, when tested, showed it to exceed twice that of a normal forged or cast steel chain. These chains are renewed after the fifth trip in accordance with company policy and the chain in question had been in use for three previous fishing trips. The components forming the tow were such that in case of excess stress, the pennant chains would part before the main warps.

**Findings**

On June 18, 1987, when the Canadian trawler "ZEILA" was engaged in hauling in her fishing gear in an attempt to free the trawl net which was fouled on the sea-bed, the pennant chain broke and stuck a crew member with force, throwing him overboard. It would appear that the fall overboard of the victim and his subsequent loss of life was due to the following contributory factors:

- the vessel's fishing net was fouled on the sea-bed resulting in greater than normal stress on all of her fishing gear and tackle;

- the victim was working on an essential task in an area of the deck considered to be dangerous during this operation;

- the victim was struck by a length of chain which parted under strain when the vessel rose on a swell;

- the chain had been in use on three previous fishing trips and many of its links were stretched out of shape;

- the victim was, in all probability, rendered unconscious before he entered the water; and

- the victim was not wearing any form of flotation device at the time.

**Other Findings**

Poor radiotelephone reception between the ship and shore resulted in the wrong person being initially identified as deceased to his family ashore.

The procedure in freeing a fouled trawl from the sea-bed is such that the participating crew must, of necessity, be subjected to unpredictable risk.


CURRENT HHOOR
CARBOT
ST JOHN'S
AVALON PENINSULA
ST JOHN'S
Holyrood
LABRADOR CURRENT - Inshore Branch
COURANT DU LABRADOR - Composante côtière
ST PIERRE BANK
CREW MEMBER LOST OVERBOARD
MEMBRE D'ÉQUIPAGE PERDU PAR-DESSUS BORD
"ZEILA"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4001
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4001 DU SHC

THE MAIN WARP IS HOVE IN ON THE MAIN WINCH UNTIL THE TRAWL DOORS ARE IN POSITION 'H'.

THE PENNANT CHAIN 'A' IS DISCONNECTED AT 'E' AND THEN CONNECTED TO THE SWEEP LINE HOOK-UP WIRE 'C' AT 'G'.

PENNANT CHAIN 'A' IS THEN HOVE IN BY THE SWEEP LINE WINCH UNTIL THE NET WIRE 'D' CONNECTION AT 'F' IS ABOUT 1 m INBOARD, PAST POINT 'J' WHERE THE STERN RAMP MEETS THE DECK.

BACK STROP 'B' IS THEN DISCONNECTED AND THE NET HAULED ABOARD.




PROCESS OF HAULING IN THE NET ON A TYPICAL STERN TRAWLER

SKETCH 1

## "GERARD LOUIS"

**Fire and grounding of the vessel and disappearance of a crew member off south coast of New Brunswick, June 19, 1987.**

---

**Summary**

The 14.47 gross ton Canadian small fishing vessel "GERARD LOUIS" was 10.97 m long and engaged in lobster fishery. Reportedly, she was equipped with a magnetic compass, VHF R/T and an unreliable Loran C for navigation and 2 standard lifejackets as her life-saving equipment. Being under 15 gross tons, the vessel was not subject to inspection by the Ship Safety Branch of the Canadian Coast Guard.

The vessel departed St. Martins, N.B. on June 18, 1987, with one person on board and following a catch of about 114 kg of lobster, the "GERARD LOUIS" anchored above Martin Head for the night. At 0530, June 19, the "KATHY AND ELLEN" contacted the "GERARD LOUIS" via VHF R/T, when the latter indicated that all was well on board. Both vessels later departed the anchorage and the "GERARD LOUIS" operated some 3 miles off Little Salmon River in approximate position 45°25'N, 65°16.5'W.

At approximately 0700, the crew aboard the "KATHY AND ELLEN" observed the "GERARD LOUIS" some 3/4 of a mile south-west and then proceeded into the forecastle for breakfast. At about 0745, the "GERARD LOUIS" was not in sight and initial attempts to raise her on VHF R/T were unsuccessful. When no sighting was reported by other fishing vessels, the "KATHY AND ELLEN" commenced search in a generally westerly direction. Upon arrival at Seely Beach, the "KATHY AND ELLEN" discovered that the "GERARD LOUIS" was on fire and grounded in approximate position 45°26'N, 65°21'W. The tide was ebbing and there was no indication as to the fate of the vessel's operator.

RCC Halifax, upon being notified of the casualty at 0952, co-ordinated SAR operations utilizing 2 aircraft, 1 CMRA vessel and other local fishing vessels. At 1700, the search was placed on 'reduced' status and the case handed over to the RCMP as a 'missing persons' case. The RCMP, the local SAR organization, along with volunteers continued to search along the shoreline and the surrounding wooded area until June 21, 1987, without success.

Although the exact cause of this casualty cannot be determined, it is suspected that the missing fisherman may have been carried overboard while resetting a lobster trap, or suffered some other misfortune at sea whilst the vessel was proceeding ahead. Apparently, the vessel subsequently

grounded on Seely Beach and listed as the ebb tide receded. The fire was probably caused by a flooded or overheated oil-fired space heater fitted in the vessel's forecastle.

The casualty resulted in the loss of the lone operator. The "GERARD LOUIS" was almost totally destroyed by the fire, with only a section of the vessel's hull planking and keel remaining. The estimated value of the vessel was $2500.

## Findings

While operating off Seely Beach on the morning of June 19, 1987, the operator of the Canadian Small Fishing Vessel "GERARD LOUIS" disappeared and the vessel was subsequently found on the beach severely damaged by the fire.

In the absence of any eyewitness to this casualty and the extensive fire damage sustained by the vessel, the precise sequence in which the casualty occurred cannot be determined. However it would appear that :

- the operator may have been carried overboard while setting a lobster trap and a fire broke out afterwards; or

- a fire broke out at sea causing the operator to fall or jump overboard, possibly in an injured condition, and the vessel subsequently grounded and listed as the water level receded with the ebb tide;

- of the two alternatives, the first is favoured and, thus, the vessel probably caught fire after the grounding, likely due to an overheated or flooded oil-fired space heater.

It would appear that the operator lost his life due to the following contributory factors:

- the vessel, engaged in the lobster fishery was manned by a single crew member; and

- the operator was not wearing a lifejacket or any other form of a personal flotation device.

## Other Findings

The vessel did not comply with the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations in that she neither carried self-igniting flares nor a lifebuoy.




"GERARD LOUIS"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No. L/C 4010

SECTION DE LA CARTE N° L/C 4010 DU SHC

F.V. "GERARD LOUIS" facing aft, shows fire damage.

B.P. "GERARD LOUIS" vue de l'arrière démontre les avaries causées par l'incendie.

F.V. "GERARD LOUIS" facing forward, shows fire damage.

B.P. "GERARD LOUIS" vue de l'avant, démontre les avaries causées par l'incendie.

Photos courtesy of RCMP. Photos: GRC



Seely Beach a.m. June 24, 1987 at approximately 1 hour before high tide. Remaining wreckage of "GERARD LOUIS" under water, centre of photograph.

La plage Seely le 24 juin 1987, au matin, environ une heure avant marée haute. Le reste de l'épave du "GERARD LOUIS" sous l'eau figure au centre de la photo.

**"BUB AND SIS"**

**Explosion and fire aboard the vessel at Southside, Cape Sable Island, N.S., July 5, 1987.**

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**Summary**

The 10.6 gross ton Cape Islander, "BUB AND SIS", was a Canadian small fishing vessel of open construction built in 1973. Her wooden hull was recently fitted with a fibreglass outer skin. The hull was divided by transverse bulkheads into 3 compartments; the accommodation forward, the engine amidships and the aft void space housing the fuel tank, propeller shaft and the pumps. A line from the fuel tank, led through the bulkhead into the engine space, was fitted with a fuel shut-off valve located some 1 m below the top of the tank and this area was not fitted with a guard to prevent the gasoline from coming in contact with hot surfaces in case of a mishap. A gasoline-driven engine capable of being started and operated from the wheel-house was located in a small, poorly ventilated engine space and no suitable device was provided to indicate the presence of gasoline vapours within this space. No notice was posted at the engine starting position requiring the ventilation system to be operated before the engine was started.

On July 1, 1987, a leak in the copper fuel line at the juncture of the fuel shut-off valve was repaired by tightening the nut. On July 3, following a fishing trip, the fuel tank was filled to capacity and no leaks were found. The shut-off valve to the tank was closed and the engine space hatch cover left open to allow additional ventilation in view of the previous leak. The crew then left "BUB AND SIS", moored in the centre with 2 vessels on either side, to return home.

On July 5, the operator proceeded to purchase some bait while the two deck-hands proceeded to prepare the vessel for departure. Upon boarding her at 0900, there was a strong smell of gasoline. One deck-hand entered the accommodation while the other opened the fuel shut-off valve, replaced the engine space hatch covers, fitted the ignition key and started the engine. A sizzling sound was heard by the deck-hand in the accommodation and some 30 seconds later an explosion was heard. It blew off the deck above his head and had set the engine space on fire. He then climbed over the side, jumped into the water and swam to the wharf. He suffered minor 'flash' burns. The other deck-hand had no recollection of events but, when found, was on the wharf. He suffered from second degree burns, and was hospitalized for 11 days.

The weather at the time was northerly winds at 10 knots, slight sea, fine and clear with 15 mile visibility.

The fire chief, employed at the fish plant, upon being alerted by the sound of the explosion, set in motion fire-fighting operations. The fire damaged three other boats moored alongside the "BUB AND SIS", including one severely. A joint effort by the fire-fighters and the fishermen brought the fire under control, eventually extinguishing it at about 0945. The still smouldering "BUB AND SIS" was towed to sea where she sank at 1230 in position 43°24.09'N 65°34.56'W in 9 fathoms (16.5 m) of water. The estimated cost of replacement and repairs to the 4 vessels was $101,000.

**Findings**

While moored alongside other fishing vessels in Southside Harbour, N.S., on July 5, 1987, an explosion occurred and fire broke out on board the small fishing vessel "BUB AND SIS" resulting in injuries to two crew members, her loss and loss of the "HELEN AND JOYCE" by fire, and fire damage to the "TANYA AND LINDA" and the "SHELLEY AND CLAY".

The sinking of the burnt-out hulk of the "BUB AND SIS" precluded her examination and consequently the precise cause of the gasoline leak cannot be determined. Of the options however, it would appear that:

- the leak probably occurred in the gasoline fuel line between the gasoline tank and the fuel shut-off valve, possibly at a juncture with the valve which had previously leaked but had been repaired.

As the result of the fuel leakage into the engine space and bilge of the "BUB AND SIS", the gasoline vapours were ignited. It would appear that the following factors contributed to the explosion and fire:

- an attempt to start the main engine was made despite the presence of a strong gasoline odour;

- the main engine on the "BUB AND SIS" was housed in a small, poorly ventilated space and no attempt was made to increase the ventilation before starting the engine;

- the engine space was not ventilated by means of a mechanical exhaust and/or an adequate natural supply system;

- no guards were fitted in the vicinity of gasoline line joints to prevent, in case of a mishap, gasoline from coming in contact with hot surfaces;

- the position of the fuel shut-off valve was such that it allowed gasoline to gravitate to the valve, thus allowing spillage to occur; and

- a suitable device to indicate the presence of gasoline vapours in the engine space was not provided.

**Other Findings**

This casualty emphasizes the need to exercise the utmost caution when operating vessels with gasoline engines.

The fast, positive reaction of the local fire department and fishermen prevented the further spread of fire to shore installations and to additional vessels.

The Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations for vessels under 15 gross tons are being revised to better reflect the safety requirement.


43°30'N
43°25'N
65°40'W
65°35'W
CAPE SABLE ISLAND
BARRINGTON
BIRCH COVE
NEW BRUNSWICK
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
MONCTON
CHARLOTTETOWN
FREDERICTON
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH
SOUTHSIDE HARBOUR
PORT DE SOUTHSIDE
"BUB AND SIS"
REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4215
SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° 4215 DU SHC
POSITION OF "BUB AND SIS" SINKING
LIEU DE L'ENGLOUTISSEMENT DU "BUB AND SIS"



Fuel shut-off valve similar to the one on "BUB AND SIS".

Soupape d'arrêt du carburant semblable à celle à bord du "BUB AND SIS".

Fuel pumps on fish plant wharf. Two similar on the public wharf on opposite side of the harbour.

Des pompes à carburant sur le quai de l'usine de traitement de poisson. Deux pompes semblables se trouvent sur le quai public du côté opposé du port.

## "WESTERN MONARCH"

**Grounding and sinking on the rocky shoreline of Hardwicke Island, Johnstone Strait, B.C., July 30, 1987.**

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**Summary**

The 79 gross-ton "WESTERN MONARCH" was a typical carvel-built wooden seiner 19.05 m long. She was in possession of a valid Steamship Inspection Certificate. She was equipped with two manually controlled electric bilge pumps located in the engine-room and one hand pump located on the afterdeck. Her navigation equipment comprised a radar, a Loran C, an echo sounder, a scanning sonar, 3 VHF sets, a magnetic compass and an autopilot, all of which were reported to be in good working condition. A Marine Atlas intended for use as a reference only by yachtsmen and small boat operators was used for navigation at the time of the casualty instead of the Canadian Hydrographic Charts which were also on board but were used mainly for fishing operations.

In the early afternoon of July 29, 1987, the vessel unloaded her catch of salmon to the fish packer in Fitz Hugh Sound and departed for Vancouver via Campbell River. The weather was fine and clear with good visibility, light airs and calm seas. The vessel was being steered by autopilot under the conduct of a crew member and was proceeding at a speed of about 9 knots. The watch changed at about 0100, July 30, and reportedly the crew member who took over the watch, although off-duty for a number of hours, had been unable to sleep and was probably fatigued. At 0230, the skipper briefly visited the wheel-house and, being satisfied with the vessel's progress, he returned to his quarters.

When off Hickey Point, the vessel should have adjusted course but such action was not taken by the crew member having the conduct of the vessel although he was in the wheel-house; there was no explanation for this inaction. At about 0409, the crew, including the skipper, were awakened by a grinding sound on the port side followed shortly by a sudden jolt as the vessel struck a rock head-on in approximate position 50°26.2'N 125°57.6'W. The engine was immediately reversed and the vessel backed off. An inspection of the forward and engine compartments revealed that the vessel was rapidly filling with water which flooded the engine and subsequently rendered the pumps useless.

The "WESTERN MONARCH" transmitted a request for assistance on VHF R/T channel 78A which was acknowledged and responded to by other fishing vessels in the area, who arrived on-scene within minutes. The "WESTERN MONARCH", which was drifting eastwards with the tide, was in the process of sinking and was pushed into shallower water off

Earl Ledge by the "CEE DEE" in order to facilitate salvage operations.

The crew abandoned the vessel in the skiff and were later rescued by another fishing vessel. The "WESTERN MONARCH" sank at 0538 in approximate position 50°25'N 125°56.7'W with her headline secured to a tree ashore. She was subsequently salvaged and towed to a shipyard in Richmond, B.C. where, following inspection, she was declared a constructive total loss. A typical insured value for a vessel of this class and size is in the order of $ 400,000 to $ 500,000.

## Findings

In the early morning hours of July 30, 1987, the Canadian fishing vessel "WESTERN MONARCH" struck the rocky coast of Hardwicke Island in Johnstone Strait, B.C. head-on, as a result of poor watchkeeping practices, and subsequently sank.

It would appear that the following were contributing factors in this casualty:

- the watchkeeper had been overcome by fatigue;
- a proper look-out was not maintained; and
- the vessel's course was not altered at the appropriate time in order to pass clear of Hardwicke Island.

## Other Findings

The "WESTERN MONARCH" initiated and transmitted a message for assistance on channel 78A instead of on channel 16 VHF R/T, the designated International Distress Safety Calling frequency.

No member of the crew on board held a Restricted Radiotelephone Operator's (Maritime) Certificate as required by the General Radio Regulations made pursuant to the Radio Act.

The large scale local charts were not in use.


APPROXIMATE TRACK OF "WESTERN MONARCH"
SILLAGE APPROCHÉ DU "WESTERN MONARCH"
INTENDED TRACK OF VESSEL
SILLAGE PROJETÉ DU NAVIRE
VESSEL STRUCK ROCK
NAVIRE A HEURTÉ LE ROCHER
VESSEL SANK
NAVIRE ENGLOUTI
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 3595
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 3595 DU SHC
Chart 3567
Nelson Ridge
NEWCASTLE RIDGE
BLENKINSOP BAY
SUNDERLAND
Hardwicke Island
SALMON BAY
VANCOUVER ISLAND
VANCOUVER
VICTORIA

"WESTERN MONARCH"



Shattered stem.
Étrave fracassée.



Damage viewed from port side.
Avaries vues de bâbord.

## "OPEN BOAT CFV No. 080197"

**Swamping of the boat with loss of one life off Placentia, Nfld., August 14, 1987.**

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**Summary**

The Canadian small wooden fishing vessel "CFV No. 080197" was an open speed boat fitted with a 35 h.p. outboard motor that engaged in longline fishing off Point Verde, Nfld. The vessel was equipped with six red flares in a watertight container placed within a 22.72 L plastic bucket; none of which was secured. The vessel carried only 1 lifevest for the 2 persons on board.

The operator, intending to set the longlines on August 12, had baited the hooks the previous day but, when the trip was cancelled due to bad weather, he salted the 728 baited hooks to prevent the bait from spoiling. On August 14, as he awaited improvement in weather conditions, he was joined by his nephew at the fishing gear locker near the community wharf at about 1500. Both men engaged in conversation and consumed some beer. At 1630 they proceeded to have a meal. The nephew, also a fisherman, volunteered to perform the duties of a deck-hand and assist the operator in setting his longlines.

At about 1830, both men returned to the locker and after loading the fishing gear into the boat, they departed from the wharf at Placentia, Nfld. bound for the fishing grounds off Point Verde. The process of setting the longlines commenced at about 1930. The mooring was set for the first longline and the staff buoy deployed. As the longline was being run out, the baited hooks became entangled, thus necessitating its retrieval. The effects of the wind and the tide caused a strain on the longline such that it was not possible for both men to haul it in. Hence, in order to facilitate hauling in the longline, the operator briefly gave 'astern' movement to the engine; by this time the vessel was stern to the 1 m seas. The engine went astern at about the same time as a wave approached the vessel causing a large quantity of water to be shipped aboard. Before corrective action could be taken, a second successive wave had shipped over the stern which effectively swamped the vessel. Within seconds the boat began to roll over and both men were displaced into the sea.

The operator, then positioned at the stern, grabbed the lifevest and gasoline container as he was washed over the side and drifted away from the boat. The deck-hand, who had moved forward, managed to stay with the boat by holding onto the painter as the boat rolled over. The operator called out

to the deck-hand to stay with the capsized boat whilst he attempted to swim towards her. The operator was observed to take only two strokes before he turned pallid, rolled onto his back, then suddenly sank beneath the surface. He was not an accomplished swimmer and reportedly had experienced chest pains in the past.

The weather at the time of the casualty was south-east winds at 5-15 knots, 1 m seas, light haze and 16° C air temperature. Seawater temperature in the area was not recorded however, for that time of the year, seawater temperatures of between 2°C to 4°C would not be uncommon.

About 3 hours later, in darkness, fog and rain, the boat suddenly righted herself. The deck-hand managed to climb into the boat and, at about 0550, he was fortuitously found by the CMRA vessel "CARLA N CINDY" which had been tasked to search for the vessel. The deck-hand was taken aboard, attended to, and transported to Argentia, where, following thorough examination at a hospital, he was treated for mild hypothermia and released.

The search for the operator continued utilizing 9 marine units and 2 air units until the end of day on August 17, when it was downgraded and the case handed over to the RCMP as a 'missing person' case. On September 5, the operator's body was sighted and recovered when it surfaced near the Erco wharf in Long Harbour, Nfld. An autopsy could not be performed owing to the advanced state of deterioration of the body. The death was attributed to drowning in seawater.

## Findings

On the evening of August 14, 1987 whilst off Point Verde and attempting to free the hooks which had become fouled in the process of setting the lines, the small open boat "CFV No. 080197" was swamped when two successive waves broke over her stern, causing the boat to roll over and throw the two occupants into the water.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the vessel's swamping:

- the victim did not recognize the hazard of operating a vessel stern-to the prevailing sea conditions;
- the vessel's freeboard at transom was low;
- the wave height was 1 m; and

- the 'astern' engine movement was used to relieve strain on the fishing gear.

It would appear that the victim lost his life due to the following contributing factors:

- the victim did not wear any form of a flotation device;
- the victim when thrown overboard drifted away from the boat and he was not an accomplished swimmer;
- the cold seawater temperature limited the victim's survival time;
- the consumption of alcohol increased the rate of body heat loss further limiting the survival time; and
- the victim's possible state of health.

Other Findings

It was fortunate that the survivor remained with the boat which increased his chance for survival.

The boat did not meet the provisions of the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations, in that she did not have an approved form of flotation device aboard for both persons.

The container, to be used as a bailer, was not dedicated to that task and, not being lashed inside, was lost.


ALL POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE ONLY
TOUTES LES POSITIONS SONT APPROCHÉES SEULEMENT
BODY OF DECEASED FOUND IN LONG HARBOUR
SEE INSET
CORPS DU DÉFUNT RETROUVÉ À LONG HARBOUR
VOIR CARTOUCHE
VESSEL FOUND
BATEAU RETROUVÉ
VESSEL SWAMPED
BATEAU ENVAHI
54°00'W
47°00'N
"CFV No. 080197"
REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4622
SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° 4622 DU SHC
ST MARY'S BAY
CURNEN HOUR
GANDER
ST JOHN'S
LONG HARBOUR
ERCO WHARF

**"LISA & TODD II" / "KIMBERLY AND JOYCE"**

**Collision off South coast of Nova Scotia,
August 26, 1987.**

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**Summary**

**F/V "LISA & TODD II"**

The 11.58 m long, 22.9 gross-ton, small fishing vessel, "LISA & TODD II" was constructed of fibreglass and was not fitted with a radar reflector. Her navigation equipment included a radar and a VHF R/T. Her radio station was licensed but none of the crew held any radio operator's certificate. She was manned by a crew of 4 none of whom had any formal marine training. The vessel was required to be inspected but the owner did not make his vessel available to the authorities for inspection despite repeated reminders.

After fishing for 6 days some 100-150 miles south-east of Nova Scotia, the vessel departed the fishing grounds at 1100, August 25, 1987, bound for Bear Point, N.S. The skipper took charge of the navigation watch at 1100 and set the vessel's course to 302°(M) on the autopilot to make good a course of 282°(T) and the full ahead engine gave her a speed of about 7 knots through the water. The radar was switched on, set on the 6 mile range and used for collision avoidance purposes; reportedly a visual look-out was also maintained. At 2400, a deck-hand arrived in the wheel-house to relieve the skipper. After adjusting the radar and ensuring that the necessary equipment was functioning satisfactorily, the skipper instructed the deck-hand to maintain the set course and not touch navigational equipment but to wake him should he sight anything visually or on the radar screen or if he was in doubt. At 0010, reportedly with no targets on radar and no visual sightings, the skipper handed over the watch to the deck-hand and retired to sleep on a bed in the wheel-house.

At 0025, the deck-hand observed the deck and flood lights of another vessel, later determined to be the "KIMBERLY AND JOYCE", bearing about 45° on the port bow and very close - an estimated 3 m. The collision occurred a few seconds later with the vessel having maintained her course and speed. The force and noise of the collision awoke the remaining crew. The skipper took charge of the vessel, steered her away and stopped the engine.

**F/V "KIMBERLY AND JOYCE"**

The 33.35 gross-ton small wooden fishing vessel "KIMBERLY AND JOYCE" is 13.9 m long and was in possession of

a valid steamship inspection certificate SIC 29. The vessel was fitted with a passive radar reflector and her navigation equipment included a radar and a VHF R/T. Her radio station was not licensed nor did any crew members hold any radio operator's certificate.

After fishing for 2 days on Baccaro Bank, the vessel departed the fishing grounds at 2200, August 25, 1987, bound for Sandy Point, N.S. The skipper who had worked from 0600 to 1800 took charge of the vessel at 2200. He set the vessel's course to 338°(M) on the autopilot to make good a course of 318°(T) and the engine on full ahead at 8.3 knots. One radar was switched on, set on the 6 mile range and used for collision avoidance purposes. A visual look-out was also maintained. At 0000, August 26, when a deck-hand arrived in the wheel-house to relieve the skipper, a white masthead light and a red side light of another vessel were sighted. By 0010, the other vessel, later identified to be the "LISA & TODD II", was 1 mile off and based on sightings, the skipper concluded that his vessel was overtaking and would pass ahead of the "LISA & TODD II". He instructed the deck-hand to maintain course and speed but carefully assess the other vessel's actions. At about 0020, the flood lights fully illuminated the "LISA & TODD II" and the deck-hand realized that the two vessels were converging and that collision was imminent as the distance between them was no more than 10 m. He therefore slowed the engine and called the skipper who was in the accommodation ready to retire. The skipper, upon arriving in the wheel-house, put the engine to stop and then immediately to full astern. It was estimated that collision occurred some 3 to 4 seconds later and the vessel's speed was about 2 knots.

**Weather conditions**

The weather conditions prior to and during the collision were winds westerly 20-25 knots causing rough seas from the west, the night was fine and clear with good visibility although in darkness; the seas occasionally broke over the foredecks of both vessels causing spray to intermittently obscure visibility through the wheel-house windows.

**Events following collision**

Following the collision, both vessels inspected the damage and, being satisfied that neither vessel was in need of assistance, they exchanged pertinent information and proceeded to their destinations; the "LISA & TODD II" arrived some 7.5 hours later and the "KIMBERLY AND JOYCE" some 3.5 hours later.

Although such collisions have a serious potential, in this case damage to both vessels was relatively minor.

**Findings**

While involved in a crossing situation enroute to their home ports, the Canadian small fishing vessels "LISA & TODD II" and "KIMBERLY AND JOYCE" were involved in a collision in darkness, rough weather and in good visibility, on August 26, 1987.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the collision:

**Both Vessels**

- complacent watchkeeping and crew management possibly brought about or accentuated by fatigue;

**"KIMBERLY AND JOYCE"**

- the disregard for or lack of knowledge of the Collision Regulations in that:

  a) all available means i.e. taking accurate visual bearings, establishing VHF communications to ascertain if there was a risk of collision were not used as required by Rule 7;

  b) although, the "KIMBERLY AND JOYCE" had the "LISA & TODD II" on her starboard side, the former did not keep out of the way of the latter as required by Rules 15 and 16;

- the handing over of the watch to an inexperienced deck-hand with instructions to maintain course and speed when the "LISA & TODD II" was only 1 mile off was imprudent;

**"LISA & TODD II"**

- the disregard for or lack of knowledge of the Collision Regulations in that no proper look-out was maintained by sight as required by Rule 5 and thus:

  a) all available means i.e. radar observation, taking accurate visual bearings, establishing VHF communications as required by Rule 7 were not used to establish if risk of collision existed;

  b) no action was taken by the stand-on vessel "LISA

& TODD II" even when risk of collision was imminent as required by Rule 17; and

- the handing over of the watch to an inexperienced deck-hand without first establishing the presence of traffic in the area was imprudent.

**Other Findings**

The "LISA & TODD II" was not inspected as required by section 381 of the Canada Shipping Act.

The "LISA & TODD II" did not carry lifejackets nor were there sufficient distress signals in a watertight container as required by the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations and/or Life Saving Equipment Regulations.

The "LISA & TODD II" was not fitted with a radar reflector as required by Rule 40 of the Collision Regulations.

The radio station aboard the "KIMBERLY AND JOYCE" was not licensed as required by the Radio Act.

None of the crew on board either vessel held a Restricted Radiotelephone Operator's Certificate (Maritime) as required by the General Radio Regulations made pursuant to the Radio Act.

Had radio communications been established between the vessels and their intention made known to each other, the collision may possibly have been avoided.

Neither vessel reported the collision as required by the Shipping Casualties Reporting Regulations.

RECONSTRUCTED TRACKS OF THE "LISA & TODD II" AND "KIMBERLY AND JOYCE" BASED ON RECOLLECTION OF EVENTS BY BOTH CREWS

SILLAGES DU "LISA & TODD II ET DU "KIMBERLY AND JOYCE" RECONSTITUÉS SELON LE SOUVENIR DES ÉVÉNEMENTS DES DEUX ÉQUIPAGES




DIAGRAMS OF VESSELS NOT TO SCALE

LES CROQUIS DES NAVIRES NE SONT PAS DRESSÉS À L'ÉCHELLE

GIVEN THAT NEITHER VESSEL ALTERED COURSE OR SPEED, FOR COLLISION TO HAVE OCCURRED THE BEARINGS FROM EACH VESSEL (θ IN THE FIGURE) MUST REMAIN CONSTANT WHILE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THEM DECREASES. IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE FIGURE THAT EACH VESSEL WAS FORWARD OF THE BEAM OF THE OTHER.

ÉTANT DONNÉ QUE NI L'UN NI L'AUTRE DES BÂTIMENTS N'A CHANGÉ DE ROUTE NI DE VITESSE, POUR QUE L'ABORDAGE AIT SURVENU, LE RELÈVEMENT DE CHAQUE BÂTIMENT (θ SUR LE CROQUIS) DOIT DEMEURER CONSTANT PENDANT QUE LA DISTANCE ENTRE EUX DÉCROIT. LE CROQUIS DÉMONTRE DE FAÇON ÉVIDENTE QUE CHAQUE BÂTIMENT SE TROUVAIT SUR L'AVANT DU TRAVERS DE L'AUTRE.

NOTE: TRACKS, POSITIONS AND TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE ONLY AND NO ALLOWANCE HAS BEEN MADE FOR SET AND DRIFT

NOTA : LES SILLAGES, POSITIONS ET HEURES SONT APPROCHÉS; IL N'Y A PAS DE COMPENSATION POUR LA DIRECTION NI LA DÉRIVE


SANDY POINT
BEAR POINT
CAMPBELLTON
NEW BRUNSWICK
CHATHAM
MONCTON
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
CHARLOTTETOWN
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
SYDNEY
FREDERICTON
NOVA SCOTIA
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH
43°30'N
64°30'W
65°30'W
65°00'W
43°00'N
ROSEWAY BASIN
TRACK OF "LISA & TODD II"
SILLAGE DU "LISA & TODD II"
POSITION OF COLLISION
LIEU DE L'ABORDAGE
TRACK OF "KIMBERLY AND JOYCE"
SILLAGE DU " KIMBERLY AND JOYCE"
REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4012
SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° 4012 DU SHC

"LISA & TODD II"

"KIMBERLY AND JOYCE"

Note: Radar reflector.
Nota : réflecteur radar.

## Glossary

| | |
|---|---|
| CCG | Canadian Coast Guard |
| CCGC | Canadian Coast Guard Cutter |
| CCGS | Canadian Coast Guard Ship |
| CGRS | Coast Guard Radio Station |
| CMRA | Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary |
| ETA | Estimated time of arrival |
| Fish Packers | Fishing vessels being used only for transportation of fish |
| FPV | Fisheries Patrol Vessel |
| Free surface effect | Whenever there is a surface of liquid which is free to move, there is a loss of effective GM due to a virtual rise of the vessel's centre of gravity and the loss of stability caused by the movement of liquid in partially filled compartments when the vessel rolls. This movement may involve a large shift of weight. |
| Freeboard | The distance between the waterline and the upper edge of the weather deck. |
| FV | Fishing Vessel |
| GM | The distance between the transverse metacentre and the vertical centre of gravity, and is an indication of a vessel's ability to right herself when heeled over. |
| M | Magnetic |
| Mayday | Distress signal |
| MEDEVAC | The urgent evacuation of a person from a vessel for medical reasons |
| MRSC | Marine Rescue Sub-Centre |

| | |
|---|---|
| Port of refuge | A reasonably safe place of retreat from winds or storms |
| r.p.m. | Revolutions per minute |
| RCC | Rescue Co-ordination Centre |
| SAR | Search and Rescue |
| SFV | Small fishing vessel |
| SIC | Steamship Inspection Certificate |
| SSB | Single sideband radio |
| T | True |
| Trim | The difference between the draught forward and aft |
| VHF | Very high frequency radio |